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| An aerial shot captures the train derailment in Washington State, Dec 18, 2017, Photo by KOMO/ABC News |
As an airline pilot, I am often asked what the most dangerous situation I have ever been in was. My answer is always, "My drive to the airport." They are amused by that, but then stop to think about it and realize that it is true. It is a statistical fact: You are more likely to be involved in an accident with possible injury or death on a U. S. Highway than you are flying on a U. S. Airline. Now I can add, "Riding on Amtrak."
I have been shocked by the recent spate of accidents involving Amtrak. In the last five years, eleven passengers died in accidents (usually derailments) on Amtrak trains. Over 267 passengers were injured. These numbers do not count people killed or injured who were not onboard (drivers and passengers of vehicles hit in railroad crossings or on tracks). The last time anyone died on a U.S.-certificated scheduled airline was Feb. 12, 2009, when Colgan Air Flight 3407, operating as a Continental Connection flight between Continental’s hub at Newark, N.J. and Buffal0, N.Y, went into an aerodynamic stall short of the runway at Buffalo. It fell to the ground in Clarence Center, N.Y., All 49 people onboard, plus one person on the ground, died in the crash. Since that crash, remarkable changes were made to aircrew rest requirements and training oversight, not to mention new hire flight time requirements (which have only exacerbated an already acute pilot shortage, and has been of questionable benefit to safety, but that is another article). That is NINE years without a single passenger fatality caused by an aircraft crash! I don't have the total number of flights that have been flown since then, nor the numbers of passengers transported, but I can only guess that it is in the millions. I am always surprised by people, who in defiance of logic, fact, and statistics tell me of their "fear of flying." Personally, I would be more prone to a "fear of railing!"
The deadliest Amtrak derailments involved excessive speed: 106 mph in a 50 mph zone (May 12, 2015, in Pennsylvania) and 80 mph in a 30 mph zone (December 18, 2017, in Washington State). NTSB reported from the PA accident that the conductor was "distracted" and "lost track of where he was." The derailment in Washington is still under investigation. In the Northeastern corridor, Amtrak has implemented "positive train control," or PTC, a safety technology that, among other things, is designed to automatically slow trains that are traveling too fast, according to the NTSB. Apparently, this technology was not in place in Washington State. Technology to improve safety is great. No expense should be spared to make transportation safer. In passenger aviation, there are constant improvements to technology that improve or enhance safety. They are always welcome, but the bottom line in aviation safety and the best device to ensure a safe and uneventful flight are well-trained pilots and a strong safety culture.
I have never been a train engineer. I am certain that most of Amtrak's operators do their best to ensure the safety of passengers. Most trains successfully and safely transport passengers on the assigned routes, but like the Buffalo crash, it only takes one to taint the entire industry. To make matters appear worse, this is ONE company, not like the airlines with its many carriers certified by the FAA to operate under part 121 (scheduled airline transport). That, to me, speaks volumes.
I write this from an airline pilot's perspective. Safety begins with leadership. Leadership nurtures the corporate culture. The culture is reflected by the actions of the employees. As a Naval Aviator prior to my airline career, and as an airline pilot, I have seen first hand what good leadership can accomplish in terms of safety. It has to be a priority. There have to be consequences for failure. Unsafe practices have to be reported, especially self-reported without fear of retribution or punishment unless it was an intentional act. We all make mistakes. The key is to find a way not to repeat them and to implement fixes, either in policy or hardware that prevents them from occurring again. Airline pilots have very specific procedures in place that have been "written in blood." Lessons learned from previous accidents are quickly implemented into what we do. An example of this is after the Comair crash in Lexington, KY when a CRJ200 took off from the wrong runway that was too short for them to become airborne, pilots now perform a verbal "runway verification" procedure. Even if there is only one runway, with no chance of being on the incorrect one, we still do that. It is ingrained in our process. The changes I mentioned above to crew rest policy were a direct result of discoveries made after the Buffalo crash.
Yet, here is Amtrak, repeating the same mistakes and costing the lives of passengers and millions of dollars in damage. Again, I don't presume to know anything about operating trains. I always thought it would be a cool job, kind of like being an airline pilot. I write this not to upset or anger any of the many hard-working Amtrack employees, but I have to wonder as a trained Naval Aviation Safety Officer, and a graduate of several civilian safety courses, why does this happen?
I know that the PTC technology will eventually be implemented throughout Amtrak's system. It is already in place within Union Pacific, the largest U.S railroad based on revenue. According to the Wall Street Journal (Jan 9, 2018) they are struggling with the new tech and are working the bugs out. Apparently, it will make a train stop when it is not supposed to. Meanwhile, there is off-the-shelf technology that can help. A GPS enabled tablet that follows the train on a moving map can alert an operator that he or she is approaching a slow speed area and flash a warning to alert the operator to slow down. These areas can be highlighted and marked on the map of the railway system. Pricey, but still cheaper than the PTC system and a good interim measure as well as a back up to the PTC. It would also greatly improve "situational awareness," something that we, as pilots frequently emphasize and rely upon to keep us out of trouble.
In the meantime, however, how about a culture change? How about procedural changes? What about oversight, reporting? What about good strong leadership? Again, this is written from an airline pilot's perspective, albeit a frustrated one as I read about these literal trainwrecks and how utterly preventable they were.
